The Consequences of July 1983
(Edited Text of a presentation at the seminar ‘Lest We Forget: the tragedy of July 1983’, arranged by the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process and the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies in commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the event)
Prof Rajiva Wijesinha
Secretary General
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process
I have been asked to speak on the political and social consequences of July 1983, and I will try to focus on these. With regard to background and causes, I said enough when I introduced the topic of the seminar, and also I have written about these at length, so I will refrain from discussing these areas here.
In talking of the political and social consequences I will look at several areas. Some of them are the obvious consequences, which have already been referred to, so I will not spend much time on them except to say that the most obvious consequences may be subsumed under the title ‘Changes in the Tamil Psyche’. That is why this morning I said the events were a watershed, because until 1983, however disappointed the Tamil community was at what they felt was a failure to resolve the problem politically, the problem that had begun not just in 1956, but as long ago as 1920 when Tamil representation in the Western Province was ignored, they saw these as political questions, to be solved politically. Despite continued disappointments - the tearing up of the pacts of 1957 and of 1968 - there was a sense that the time would come when this could be discussed politically. And that hope was crushed in the minds of Tamils by the events of 1983.
The consequence of that was something that has been really very corrosive, a certain bitterness. This has had tremendous ill consequences for Sri Lanka, but consequences we cannot say were undeserved, in terms of the power of the Diaspora. Tamils left this country after 1983 in a sense of bitterness, of understandable bitterness, and they have since contributed to the type of feeling that both previous speakers referred to and many others earlier today, the sense in the international community - and I do not refer only to the west, which sees itself sometimes as the sole international community, but also to other countries like the Philippines, as Dr Ariyaratne said, or India, which felt that we were a brutal country. I think what happened in 1983 explains that feeling. And even though it has not happened again, it is an understandable feeling, and not enough effort has been made by successive Sri Lanka governments to suggest that that was a mistake, it should not have happened and we will make sure it will never happen again. Unless that is done very clearly I think there is no hope of the bitterness being got rid of. I am not saying that this will get rid of the bitterness. It will last beyond that. But at least it would be a start and I think it is necessary to get that picture clear.
The second factor, which was exacerbated not only by the tragedy of July 1983 but also by the political response, was to destroy democratic Tamil forces. We all know that on July 28 JR Jayewardene’s public response was that the mayhem was what he described as the understandable reaction of the Sinhalese to attempts to divide the country. He said therefore that he would make sure such attempts were no longer possible by introducing legislation, which in effect led to the TULF having to leave Parliament. The baton passed, on that day, to the terrorists. I think that is an unquestionable fact. The TULF no longer had a political role to play. You have to remember that, in any case, the election of 1977 was for a Parliament for 6 years, which was to end in July 1983. That parliament had been extended. No elections were therefore held till 1989, and there were no democratically elected representatives of the Tamils, apart from Mr. Thondaman, in Parliament from 1983 to 1989. So power passed to the terrorists.
And it must also be remembered that a combination of the two factors I just mentioned led to Indian intervention. I know there are many people who claim that India was interfering before but, as Mr. Moonesinghe pointed out, in 1977 Tamil Nadu was firm about dealing with Kuttimani on our behalf. And it was only after the anti-Tamil riots of 1977 and 1981 that Tamil Nadu opinion began to change. For various political reasons India was wary about Sri Lanka but the evidence of training of terrorists is post 1983 and I think any Sri Lanka should recognize that Sri Lanka asked for it. They asked for it for a variety of reasons, including the gamesmanship of President Jayewardene with regard to the Cold War, but worst of all because of what happened in July 1983. So that you had this change, as I said, this 3-fold change. There was the change in the Tamil psyche, which contributed to the influence of the Diaspora, and the change in international opinion. There was much greater aggression on the part of India. And there was the triumph of terrorist forces which of course, as has been explained, were by and large resolved, when in 1987 we healed the breach with India. But the problem was that the LTTE remained intransigent and has remained intransigent since.
There is another consequence we need to look at, namely the change also in the Sinhala psyche. I think in that respect, as the two former speakers have mentioned, there was an improvement. Both of them referred to the involvement of ordinary people in what happened, and even though the prime responsibility was that of those – in government as I have said before – who planned it all, we have to grant that ordinary people too participated. But their involvement it must be stressed was provoked. I think what is forgotten is that in the period upto 1983 – and we must note that it has not happened since - there was a relentless media campaign to turn people against the Tamils. And people are gullible. Not all the people. As the preceding speaker said, many people sheltered Tamils, responded adversely to the horrors. But many people did get involved.
Now leaving aside the question of crowd psychology there is the very simple fact that the pressures on the Sinhala people were immense in those six years. I mentioned before what happened in 1981, and let me repeat it more comprehensively for people who have forgotten. In 1981 we had an appalling attack in Jaffna. The Jaffna MP was nearly killed. The Jaffna Public Library was burnt. When this was brought up in Parliament, far from a motion of no confidence against Cyril Mathew being allowed, they allowed a motion of no confidence against the Leader of the Opposition and every day the papers were full of the concept not only of ‘TULF equals Tigers’ but even ‘Tamil equals Tiger. And that mindset was built up relentlessly. And again that was done in 1983. Some people say it was part of Jayewardene’s attempt to dragoon the TULF into the All Party Conference, which they had refused to attend. But the media at that point – and you have to remember that it was a monopolistic media, the radio station and both television stations were entirely in government hands, the media was entirely in government hands except for the relatively new Island Group and the Aththa which was then banned – the media, government propaganda, tried to create in the minds of the Sinhalese the idea that Tamil equals terrorists. And because of this creeping evil bursting out in 1983, I think people realized that this would not do and this must not happen again. And it has not happened again. There are of course isolated examples in the papers of that type of approach. As Dr Ariyaratne said some people say provocative things of that sort, and then something else different the next week. The point is, there has not since then been such a concerted campaign, a concerted attempt to pervert the Sinhala psyche. That had stopped.
Jehan Perera mentioned very positively changes in education in the 1990s and I think he was correct in paying due credit to that. I think the factor that Dr Ariyaratne mentioned, the determination that children should learn other languages, this too is a positive change. Such changes would have been impossible in the early 80s because of the racist mindset that was being propagated relentlessly. And of course it’s ironic that the international community, which turned against us after 1983, did not notice this. But the fact is, one of the most important things is that after 1983 we began to realize that early warning systems were essential, to stop that type of thing happening again. And I think we have done our best in that respect.
Now I would like to refer to another area that has not been looked at, which should be considered in the light of the complaint that many of those invited to this event did not attend. Conversely we should note that perhaps the largest representation here is from the security forces, past or present, and the Ministry of Defence. I think that says a lot for the transformation of our security forces in the last 25 years into what is to my mind the most professional public institution we have in this country at the moment. I know I say something that may be considered unorthodox, but the evidence suggests this is a fact. This is the one public institution in the country that still tries to think and improve itself. And that I think is the result of what happened in 1983. In 1983, I am sorry to say, there had been for the preceding, not just six years but perhaps 13 years, a campaign of de-professionalistaion. There are some who would say that the de-professionalisation of our public institutions was perhaps accidental during the 1970 to 1977 period. It certainly happened. But it was qualitatively greater in the next six years, deliberately so, and the judiciary is a case in point.
If you look at the judiciary from 1970 to 1977 it was markedly independent. It came into conflict with the government on numerous occasions. From 1977 there was a determination to bring it under the total control of the government. The same thing happened to the Attorney General’s Department and I think, if you read the account of the Welikada massacres, the most startling indictment there is of the combination of Judiciary and AG’s Department in suppressing the truth. This was part of an institutional change during the late ’70s and early ’80s and to my mind the turning point, almost as in a Greek tragedy, in the arrogance of the Jayewardene Government, was what happened not in July but four months earlier, when they attempted to attack the Supreme Court judges who had delivered a verdict of violation of human rights.
We have come a long way since that. Now, when people talk about the situation now, they forget that it is unthinkable that if the Supreme Court delivered a verdict against the government, government goons in government buses would be transported to demonstrate outside Supreme Court Judges’ house. But this was normal in 1983. And that breakdown of institutions also affected, to a great extent, elements in the armed forces. But as the account of the Welikada massacres shows, when the professionals were called out, they acted responsibly, in a way that the politicians had not encouraged. And that situation has continued to improve. There are those who say that in the ’80s the Sri Lankan army was the worst disciplined in the world. That may be an exaggeration, but certainly there were aberrations. There was a thirst for revenge on occasions. There were terrible incidents that happened. That has not happened in recent years. The training that developed over the next few years, the insistence on a professional approach, is something we can be proud of. I am not saying it is perfect but I think that you will find that the imperfections have to do with political contingencies.
One major problem that still persists is that after 1983 the recruitment of minorities fell considerably. People complained, I do all the time, about the absence of minorities from the Sri Lankan security forces. The answer has always been that it is open to them to apply, but after 1983 applications dried up. Very few applied. If you look at the higher echelons of the army, there are Tamils. If you look at the higher echelons of the police there are plenty of them. But they just haven’t been applying recently. But now there have been positive measures taken by this government to promote minority recruitment, which have not been given enough credit - partly because this government is not very good at pointing out its positive features. One of the most positive is the targeted recruitment of Tamils into the security forces. All previous governments complained that Tamils were not applying. They kept advertising, Tamils did not apply. This government has said, ‘Ok if they are not applying, we will go out and find them’. And I think that it is an immensely positive step and it is part of the developing national awareness of the security forces, which as we know sometimes gave a reflection of negative factors within the country but have now moved on apace.
And I think in that sense one of the most important political and social consequence of 1983 was the recognition that the monolithic power of a particular government could not be tolerated any more. There are people who say this constitution is bad. It is bad. The whole manner in which it was introduced was a mark of the lack of professionalism. We may disagree with many features of the 1972 Constitution but it was done professionally. It is not a constitution that is inconsistent and incoherent. I disagree with its fundamental principle, which is supposedly based on a British principle. Good Trotskyists, bred in the London School of Economics, followed a British constitutional pattern and asserted the supremacy of Parliament which I think is nonsense but it is a consistent belief. The 1977 Constitution however is a joke. It is inconsistent. It was introduced as an amendment, not as a new constitution, and its constitutional provisions, although very bad, were then perverted by the way in which it was manipulated. It has not been manipulated in the same way since. There are independent institutions. We have an independent media. I mean for people working now it is unthinkable that there was no television or radio stations, apart from government ones, in the ’80s. There were no newspapers until the Island started. The Supreme Court is not packed now in the way it was then.
Again there will be people who would disagree with some of the judgments of the Courts but no one will say that it is under the control of the government. There is a contrast between now and what happened in the ’80s, when for instance Justice Rodrigo, in a famous judgment after the 1982 referendum, basically said, ‘Why does anyone bring challenges to a government, after all the government was elected by the people. It should be allowed to do what it wants.’ That, I think, is not an unfair representation of what Justice Rodrigo wrote in one of his judgments, at that time.
But that sort of perversity, the perversion of the State, culminated in July 1983 and then it changed after that. And I think that was something for the better. We have suffered since because, as I said, as our national politics got better, the Tamil psyche, for very understandable reasons, got more bitter and that has led to continuing conflict.
In this light I believe the approach of this government in dealing with the different problems is perhaps more logical than that of past governments. Although I give credit to the governments who tried to negotiate with the LTTE as Jehan said that has proved impossible. So I think that instead of pursuing chimeras it is necessary to say ‘No’ to terrorism but ‘Yes’ to a pluralistic democratic Sri Lanka. And I go back to a point Jehan made. He spoke of the lack of faith in a negotiated solution after 1983. I think that was true on the part of many Tamils, and it got worse after 1987 when the Sri Lanka government for various reasons seemed to join together with the LTTE, and therefore also let down those Tamils who had abandoned terrorism and joined politics. I think what this government is trying to do on the contrary is work together with democratic Tamil forces, to arrive at a negotiated solution, bearing in mind the need that for acceptance throughout the country.
Meanwhile the work that people have mentioned already has confirmed the change in the Sinhala psyche after 1983, and thereafter too, it is now willing to accept devolution, willing to accept a pluralistic state. I think that work will be invaluable in promoting the negotiated political solution that we need. But we have to remember that the terrorist aspect cannot be dealt with except by ensuring that terrorism is abandoned and arms are given up. I like to share the view expressed already that there are certain elements in the LTTE, like those in the Eastern Province, which will be happy to enter a political process as various Tamils did in 1987 but I think we need to be sure about that.
Before I conclude however, I would like to read out to you the last section of an account by the Jaffna University Teachers for Human Rights of perhaps the worst episode in 1983. The account will be published in ‘Lest We Forget: the tragedy of July 1983’, that should have been out today, but which will now be published only next week. This section, written I think by Rajan Hoole, is from the postscript to the detailed account of what happened in Welikada and the attempts at cover up:
Many years have flown since that eventful month of July 1983. But it would be wrong to say that the dark secrets of Welikade prison lie buried in the sands of time. Their effects are still with us. Those who lived through it remain haunted by the experience. Many of the prisoners who survived went on to become militant leaders, who were dedicated to fighting the State. Some in turn became killers. Mr and Mrs Nithyananthan rejoined the LTTE in India and left in disillusionment the following year. Fr Slngarayar re-established contact with the LTTE, and died in Jaffna in 1993, a lonely and broken man. Fr Sinnarasa who escaped to India in September 1983 distanced himself from the LTTE for several years, but is now in North America campaigning for the LTTE in a spirit of blind hatred not different from that which moved the Cyril Mathews of July 1983. Arulanandam David of the Gandhiyam lives in India, a man of gentle pursuits, dabbling in literary and philosophical matters. But in his political opinion he is perhaps even more a blind Eelamist, dreaming of a Tamil Israel, supporting the group which tortured and killed several of his old friends in the PLOTE. Douglas Devananda now leads the EPDP and once again narrowly survived after a second prison attack on him at Kalutara. He was badly mauled by LTTE suspects whom he visited as an MP in 1998.
Let me note that Major Sunil Pieris, who was responsible for Douglas being alive now, is here with us today, and will speak this afternoon. That fact, the fact that Douglas is now a Minister, the fact that we now have a Provincial Council in the East, headed by a Tamil leading a truly multi-ethnic political group, suggest that perhaps we have begun to turn the corner after 1983.